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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
AMJACS INTERWEST, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ,

vs.

No. 16236

CARL SMITH,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF

DEFENDANT-RES~ONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant properly states the case in its
brief.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-Appellant, ,Amjacs Interw·est, Inc., brought
an action against Carl Smith,

("Smith") personally as well as

against all partners of Design Associates, a Utah partnership.
On June 20, 1978, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment
against Smith personally and Unico, Inc., a Utah corporation.
Smith filed a counter-motion and asked to be dismissed from
the suit.

Judgment was granted against Unico, Inc., because

it was clearly a partner in Design Associates.
was a corporation solely owned by Smith.

Unico, Inc.

Plaintiff argued that

the terms of the partnership agreement made Smith personally a
partner in Design Associates.

Plaintiff also argued equitable

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

relief should be granted them against Smith and that
was merely a shield for Smith.

un1co,
·

The Court held smi'th was not

personally liable and the cause of action against Smith was
dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Design Associates was a partnership made by written
agreement on December 26, 1975, and the first paragraph of that
agreement states as follows:
"This agreement entered into between Unico, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as Uni co, and Richard Fletcher,
Gordon Steed, and Jerald Granquist, collectively
hereinafter referred to as the firm."
(R. 52, R. 102,
Exhibit A)
The above individuals signed the partnership agreement and
Unico, Inc. signed "Carl T. Smith, President, Unico, Inc."
(R. 102, Exhibit A).

Carl Smith declared by affidavit he had

never been a partner in Design Associates, that he personal~
had no knowledge of any merchandise, goods or services being
obtained from Arnjacs by Design Associates until the account
became delinquent, and that he had never representated to Mj~
or ever represented publicly that he was a partner in or an age·
of Design Associates

(R. 109,110).

Design Associates, the

partnership, became indebted to Arnj acs between November 1,
to June 20, 1977 (R. 96).

·

Lengthy interrogatories were

1

1971

submitt'

by Arnjacs, Unico, Inc. and Smith (R. 29-45, R. 53-56) and

I

.
d certai'
approximately 11 pages of answers to interrogatories an

I

7-59 I
partnership documents were filed in the record (R. 5
91-93), and in addition,

86-~::

affidavits were submitted by Arnjacs' I
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__j

general manager and Carl Smith, along with attachments thereto.
(R.

96, 109-110).

In total, the lower court had some 113

pages of pleadings and evidence to consider after reviewing
each party's briefs and hearing their arguments in open court,
and thereupon, the Court found that Carl Smith could not have
been a partner as a matter of law and dismissed the cause of
action as to him.

(R. 115).

Thereupon, plaintiff appealed to

this court.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING SMITH'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING THE ACTION
AS TO HIM.
There was substantial evidence showing that Unico, Inc.
was a partner in Design Associates, principally the partnership
agreement itself.
~he

Although there is substantial evidence in

record relating to the relationship of Design Associates

as debtors to Amjacs and liability on the part of all partners
to the partnership agreement, there is no evidence that Carl
Smith should be found personally liable for payment of the debt
incurred by the partnership.
POINT I
THE WRITTEN PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT DOES NOT ESTABLISH
SMITH PERSONALLY AS A PARTNER IN DESIGN ASSOCIATES.

t~

Design Associates partnership agreement entered prior

,I

'I

I

to any indebtedness

to

Amjacs declares who the partners

are, ie.Unico, Inc., Richard Fletcher, Gordon Steed, and

I
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Jerald Granquist.

(R. 102, Exhibit A).

Further emphasis of

that point is made when the president of Unico, Inc. signed
"Carl T. Smith, President, Unico, Inc."

(R. 102, E.xhibit

A),

Plaintiffs claim that Smith was one of the partners by
alluding to such language as "Whereas, Smith is in a positioo
to assist in the business through initial financing through
his solely owned corporation, Unico, Inc."

(R. 102, ExhibitA),

and other such references to Smith's name in the partnership
agreement, that he is a partner.

It is common knowledge

that all corporations operate through individuals and Smith,
as president of the corporation, was acting on behalf of
corporation.

~e

He even signed the partnership agreement as

"President, Unico, Inc."

Any reference to the use of his

talents in the partnership agreement must be construed as
reference to his talents as president of Unico, Inc. because
of the manner in which the document was drafted.

To rule

otherwise would make it necessary to totally ignore the well
established laws governing partnerships as well as corporations.
Certainly, there was ample evidence before the court to make
the determination that Carl Smith was not a partner in Desi~
Associates based upon the written partnership documents in
existence.
POINT II
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FOR CONSIDERATION BY
THE LOWER COURT THAT CARL SMITH WAS NOT A PARTNER
UNDER ANY EQUITABLE THEORIES OF PARTNE~SHIP SUCH
AS ESTOPPEL OR ALTER EGO.
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j

Plaintiffs are demanding that the case be referred back to the
lower court for additional evidentiary hearings to establish that
under some equitable principles, Amjacs is entitled to recovery
against Smith personally by disregarding the corporation structure
of Unico, Inc. One of their theories is partnership by estoppel.
Utah Code Annotated, 48-1-13,

(1953 as amended), reads:

"Partner by Estoppel - 1. When a person by
word spoken or written or by conduct represents
himself, or consents to another's representing
him, to anyone as a partner, in an existing
partnership or with one or more persons not
actually partners, he is liable to any such
person to whom such representation has been
made who has on the faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent
partnership, and, if he is made such representation or consented to it being made in a
public manner, he is liable to such person,
whether the representation has or has not
been made or communicated to such person so
giving credit by, or with a knowledge of,
the apparent partner making the representation or consenting to it being made."
There can be no equitable relief under the partnership by
estoppel statute because Amjacs never relied on any representations made by Carl Smith that he would, in fact, be liable as
a partner.

(R. 109,110).

The best Amjac can do is claim that

sometime after June 8, 1977, after most of the debt was already
incurred, they received a 1976 Unico, Inc. balance sheet which,
at the bottom, stated, "Principal:
Utah address.

(R. 97, Exhibit B).

Carl T. Smith" with an Ogden,
At that point in time, the

bull was already out of the chute - the indebtedness had been
incurred prior to that date.

(R. 2, 97, Exhibit C).

Amjacs
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even ad.mi ts they were dealing with "Design Associates and not
Carl Smith", when they declare that "Carl Smith did not person,'

ally ever submit a written request to the plaintiffs for the
goods and services which were supplied to the defendants." {R,
There is ample evidence in the record to show that Carl Smith
was not

partner

by es toppe 1.

The second equitable theory is that of alter ego.

The

brief submitted in support of plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment to the trial court claims Smith was only trying to use
the corporation as a shield and that any way you look at it, th:
result is the same.

"Carl Smith is personally liable for the

debts of Design Associates, as is his solely owned corporation,
Unico, Inc. " (R. 102), and that he .... "has at times tried to
use his solely owned corporation as a shield

, . . .."

(R

.

I

102).

Certainly, that theory of alter ego was before the court below.
Plaintiff now claims that there are still so many material f~t
left open concerning that issue that this court should reverse
the lower court and return the case for additional evidence.
They refer to numerous cases in an effort to bolster their
position.

It is defendant's position that the lower court had

available to i t all the evidence that was necessary to resolve

I

that equitable issue.
Any consideration of disregarding the corporate structilll
must commence with the presumption that there is a valid corpoCI
structure.

This court has previously stated,

I
I
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"Un~er some circumstances, the corporate
entity may be disregarded in the interests
of justice in such cases as fraud contravention of law or contract, or public wrong.
However, great caution should be exercised
by the courts in disregarding the entity."
E.R. Shaw v. Bailey-McCune Company, 355 P2d
321, 322 (Utah 1960).

The court further cautioned about disregarding the corporate
entity, even though the stock is owned by a single individual.
That concept, as well as a restatement of the factors that must
be shown to find alter ego are declared in an earlier case of
Surgical Supply Center v. Industrial Commission, 223 P 2d 593,
596

(Utah 1950). Only to prevent fraud or defend crime or

injustice will the court look through the veil of corporate
structure.

Court in that case declared,

"While upon ~quitable principles, the legal
entity of a corporation may be disregarded
when it is the mere alter ego or business
conduit of an individual, or when the notion
of its legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
or defend crime, (1 Fletcher, CYC. COR., 135),
still, it is the general rule that although
one person owns all the stock of a corporation he and the corporation are in law, two
sepa~ate and distinct persons." (Supra, 596).
Therefore, to disregard the corporate structure and enter judgment against Carl Smith personally, the court must find that
Carl Smith used the corporate structure to:
a.

Commit

fraud,

b.

Justify wrong,

c.

Contravene law or contract,

d.

Or defend crime.
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The facts are so clear with many pages of evidence in '
this case that none of the above were committed by Carl Smith,
that the corporate structure should not be disreg,arded.

Carl

Smith at no time represented to AmJ'acs that he would be person-

1

l

ally liable for the debt they are now attempting to collect
from the partnership.

He simply had no dealings at all with

them, and it was only after the debt was incurred, they began
to try and recover from him.

Amjacs could have exercised

caution about whom they were dealing with before the debt was
incurred or not have allowed the debt to get out of hand, as
i t did, but they obviously elected to run the risks.

How they

are before this court arguing that Carl Smith has either
committed fraud,

justified wrong, contravened law or contract,

or defended crime, or at least there is not ample evidence
before the lower court to make the determination that has
and they should have a rehearing on that issue.

occ~r:J

The evidence

is overwhelming that none of the foregoing did occur, based upc;
the record.

Amj acs contracted with Design Associates for pay·

ment of the debt.
personally.

I

They never did contract with Carl Smith

That is clear in the record.

They simply never

did look to Carl Smith for payment of the debt until after it
.
.
had been incurred, as per their own admission.

(R. 87) and all

·
·
in
t h e world are not going to change
the evi· d entiary hearings
the facts as clearly established below.

The record shows the

location and function of Unico, Inc. since the date of its
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1

incorporation in 1966,

(R. 49),

every line of business engaged

in, the types of business engaged in, each person who had been
affiliated with Unico, Inc. in the positions of chief executive
officer, chief operating officer, general manager, secretary,
treasurer, chairman of the board, members of the board, sales
manager or equivalent, every person who had been legal or
official owner of more than ten percent of any stock since the
date of its incorporation, the relationship that any such parties
had to Carl Smith, any transfers of property to any business
entity of Carl Smith, and transfers of property to Carl Smith
directly, any considerations therefore, and numerous pages of
such questions which were a part of the record for consideration
by the court below.

(R. 49-52, 92-93).

And now plaintiff

requests that this court send this case back for additional
evidence under the apparent theory that failure to do so would
"promote injustice".

The evidence is already so clear that

there is not an injustice to Amjacs or the public by failure to
disregard the corporate structure.

Plaintiffs have relied

heavily on Plotkin v. National Lead Company, 482 P.2d 323,
(Nev. 1971).

In that case, summary judgment had been entered

against Mr. and Mrs. Plotkin, who had been the owners of stock
in a corporation named American Paint & Supply.

The Plotkins

had written to National Lead, to whom the corporation was
ou through American Paint"
indebted "regarding the balance We Owe Y
and then later, Mrs. Plotkin stated to counsel for National Lead

It was
Sponsored
by the
Law Library.
for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum
and Library Services
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"$ 1,70.
2 S.J.
36Quinney
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the Funding
correct
indebtedness
amount·"
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obvious the facts were not clear that the corporation structure
should be disregarded with such evidence in the record, and of
course, the matter was referred back for

additiona~

hearing

after the court stated that the facts on the record did not
support the alter ego theory, as follows:
"It is apparent that under the facts as related,
there was not an assumption of the corporate
debt.
It is equally clear that the scanty
record will not permit one to conclude, as a
matter of law, that the alter ego doctrine
should be applied.
The record, at this moment,
does not disclose that the corporation was
governed by the Plotkins; that there was such
a unity of interest and ownership that one is
inseparable from the other; and that adherence
to the fiction of separate entity would promote
injustice."
The facts are totally different in this case, in that

then~

clear record evidence below that no injustice would occur by
failure to apply the concept of alter ego.

Again, the law

states that to apply the equitable principle of alter ego again::
an individual by disregarding the corporate veil, there must
be a clear showing that there was such a "unity of interest and
ownership that one is inseparable from the other

and .

··I

that adherence to the fiction of separate entity \vould promote
injustice."

957.

McCleary Cattle Co. v. Sewell, 73 Nev. 279,317 PM

The only injustice imaginable in this case would be f~

Carl Smith personally to be required to pay Amj acs for a debt
contracted between Amj acs and

Design Associates partnership.

Amjacs simply could never show they will suffer a wrong, fraud
or injustice at the hands of Carl Smith in this case, because
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l

they never did look to him for payment until after the fact.
The record is clear that the principle of alter ego or other
equitable reliefs claimed by plaintiffs will not apply in this
case and that is what the trial court determined in dismissing
Smith from the suit.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs' claim that additional evidence is
required to resolve the issues at bar is unwarranted.

The

record is clear that Carl Smith was not a partner in Design
Associates, that Amjacs could never show fraud, public wrong
or injustice at the hands of Carl Smith and that the corporate
structure should not be set aside and disregarded herein.

The

findings and order of the trial court should be sustained.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

~

::V-7-day of June, 1979.
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